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Operationalising the Responsibility 
to Protect  
 
The Continuing Debate over where Authority 
should be Located for the Use of Force
Nicholas J. Wheeler 

Executive Summary 
This report focuses on the question of where authority should be 
located for the use of force. This question has been a matter of con-
siderable controversy since NATO unilaterally employed force to pro-
tect the Kosovars in March 1999. At the heart of this debate has been 
the question of whether the UN Security Council should be the only 
body that can authorise the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Or 
alternatively, are there substitutes for Security Council authority that 
can and should be invoked – both legally and morally – in cases where 
the Council is either unable (because of the power of the veto) or 
unwilling (because of the lack of majority support in the Council) to 
act to prevent or end mass atrocities.  
 
Restricting itself to a focus on the military dimension of R2P, this 
report identifies seven models of authority which span the boundary 
from consent to non-consensual action. These are: (1) consent freely 
given; (2) coerced and induced consent; (3) Security Council authori-
sation; (4) the Security Council as a global jury; (5) General Assembly 
authorisation; (6) Regional arrangements; and (7) coalitions of the 
willing. The level of controversy regarding the legitimacy and legality 
of using force for protection purposes increases as intervention moves 
into the non-consensual realm. Even if governments disagree about 
the efficacy of using force, it is recognised that sovereign states have 
the right to request such assistance. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General 
and his advisors have identified assisting (the military component is 
only one dimension here) states in fulfilling their responsibilities for 
protection as a key goal in operationalising the 2005 Outcome Docu-
ment. However, as my report argues, the boundary between consent 
and non-consent is an imprecise one, and it is necessary to recognise 
that consent for military deployments is often secured through the 
threat of coercive pressures (as with the case of East Timor in Septem-
ber 1999) as well as inducements in the form of rewards. 
 
From the seven models of authority identified, five are ones that might 
be employed by governments in cases where a target state is ‘mani-
festly failing’ to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (as set out in paragraph 
139 of the Outcome Document). The least controversial here is Secur-
ity Council authorisation, but the proclivity of the Council to interpret 
Article 39 of Chapter VII as permitting such uses of force is a recent 
normative development, and one that should not be underestimated 
when set against the Security Council’s narrow statist interpretation of 
Nicholas J. Wheeler 6 
Article 2 (7) during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the report points out 
that whilst the new norm of Security Council authorised protection has 
enabled interventions that were previously unthinkable, this has not 
ensured that action has been taken when it was most desperately 
needed such as in Rwanda, and more controversially in Darfur. There 
is also the possibility that future cases might see the Council reversing 
this expansive interpretation of Chapter VII, and many governments in 
the Non-Aligned Movement remain sensitive about the Council ex-
panding its competence into matters that were previously covered by 
Article 2 (7) of the Charter. 
 
The report explores the potential of General Assembly authorisation 
when the Security Council is deadlocked (as could have happened if 
Western governments had sought a mandate for intervention in 
Darfur). However, this poses a host of problems that will caution gov-
ernments, especially those with a vested interest in maintaining the 
authority of the veto from pressing their claims in this body. The legi-
timacy that would flow from an affirmative vote in the General 
Assembly is the strongest argument here, but critics of the Assembly 
who favour vesting authority in a ‘concert of democracies’ would 
reply that decisions on whether to save endangered peoples should not 
rest with an Assembly that is comprised of a large number of govern-
ments that do not have good human rights credentials in their own 
jurisdictions.  
 
The above criticism opens up the much larger question of UN reform 
but advocates of R2P have not been afraid to enter this terrain. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
argued in 2001 that the five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil (P5) should limit the exercise of the veto in cases where there was 
majority support for a resolution authorising intervention for human 
protection (unless vital interests were at stake). However, such a pro-
posal would not resolve divisions between the P5 such as those that 
arose over Kosovo because what was at stake in the latter case was not 
a capricious Russian and Chinese threat to veto NATO’s action but 
genuine differences of opinion over whether the use of force was war-
ranted. Moreover, what made the Kosovo case such a difficult one for 
the Council was that NATO was seeking a mandate (though it never 
tabled a formal resolution) to use force to prevent what it argued was 
an impending humanitarian catastrophe. Justifying preventive or anti-
cipatory intervention for protection purposes is extraordinary difficult 
because action will always lack the legitimacy that comes from media 
reports of mass atrocities. This seems an inescapable problem and cer-
tainly one that will not be resolved by any of the proposed reforms to 
the Security Council’s working methods or practices.  
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Consequently, we are left with the prospect of future Kosovo-type 
situations where the permanent members (perhaps expanded beyond 
the P5) are divided on the merits of military action. Yet the Security 
Council’s handling of the Kosovo case might also offer the best prece-
dent for how the international community should cope with future 
cases of this kind. The lesson of Kosovo, and especially the abject 
defeat of the Russian draft resolution condemning the bombing, is that 
Council members are not ready to legally sanction armed intervention 
for humanitarian purposes that lacks express Council authorisation. 
But neither will they always condemn it. A majority of Council mem-
bers were persuaded that NATO’s breach of the strict procedural rules 
of the UN Charter should be excused and in this sense it operated an 
international equivalent to mitigation in domestic law.  
 
By contrast with those liberal interventionists who wish to establish 
the principle that coalitions of the willing have the authority to con-
sider using force in cases where the Security Council is paralysed 
from acting, the Kosovo model of the Security Council as a global 
jury has the virtue of not directly challenging the Council’s authority 
whilst also preserving an emergency exit when it is ‘manifestly fail-
ing’ to protect populations from genocide and mass killing. 

Operationalising the Responsibility 
to Protect  
The Continuing Debate over where Authority 
should be Located for the Use of Force1 
 
 
 
 
This report seeks to contribute to the debate over operationalising the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) as agreed by the heads of state and 
governments in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document 
from the 2005 World Summit. Specifically, it seeks to focus on the 
challenges that face the UN – crucially the Security Council – in deve-
loping ‘timely and decisive’ responses to mass atrocities. To this end, 
the paper identifies different models of military intervention that span 
the continuum from state based consent to situations where UN bodies 
act without consent. These models open up the question of how gov-
ernments should proceed in cases where the Security Council is 
unable to agree on timely and decisive action, and where particular 
states use force to prevent or stop a humanitarian emergency. The 
question of what to do in a future Kosovo-like situation, one where the 
permanent members are divided over the merits of using force, has 
divided the international community since NATO’s unilateral action 
over Kosovo. Paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document requires that 
any collective action in support of R2P must be ‘in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII’. This has led some commentators 
to argue that the 2005 Outcome Document closes the door on unilate-
                                                 
1  The ideas in this paper were presented to a workshop on ‘Operationalising the 
Responsibility to Protect’ which was organised by NUPI and held on 29-30 
October at Holmen Fjordhotel outside Oslo. I would like to thank all the partici-
pants at the workshop for their contributions. I am grateful to Alex Bellamy, 
Frazer Egerton, Kristin Marie Haugevik, and Eli Stamnes for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this report. I would also like to thank Frazer, Vincent Keating, 
and Rachel Owen for the excellent research assistance they provided during the 
preparation of this report. The report develops themes from the following publi-
cations: Nicholas J. Wheeler ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsi-
bility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit’, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations, 2 (1) (Winter 2005), pp. 95-105; Nicholas J. Wheeler 
and Justin Morris, ‘Justifying Iraq as a humanitarian war: the cure is worse than 
the disease’, in W.P.S. Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), The Iraq Crisis and 
World Order: Structural and Normative Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2007), pp. 444-64; Nicholas J. Wheeler and Frazer Egerton, 
‘The Responsibility to Protect: a “precious commitment or a promise unfulfil-
led?’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 1 (2009), 1-19. 
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ral and regional action without prior Security Council authorisation.2 
But others have argued that the language in the Outcome Document 
cannot be the last word on military intervention to end genocide and 
mass killing, and that there is a legal and moral justification for using 
force, even if this lacks express Security Council authorisation.3  
 
The report identifies varying models of armed intervention that span 
the consent/coercion boundary. I have divided these into two broad 
categories, each of which has a series of sub-categories. These can be 
thought of as steps through which the intervention process can pro-
ceed. The first category is that of consent-based models of interven-
tion. This can be sub-divided into the following two types: (1) consent 
freely given by a government and/or armed factions fighting within a 
territory and (2) coerced and induced consent where a government 
and/or armed factions are persuaded to accept an intervention force 
through the use of positive rewards and/or the threat or use of coercive 
but non-forcible measures. The second category focuses on how the 
UN should proceed in cases where consent is not forthcoming. The 
report divides these up into the following five types: (1) Security 
Council authorisation; (2) the Security Council as a global jury; (3) 
General Assembly authorisation; (4) regional arrangements; and (5) 
coalitions of the willing.4 
Consent-Based Models of Intervention 
Paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document calls upon all states to help 
governments meet their responsibilities for protection. Far from weak-
ening sovereignty, the wording in paragraph 138 is aimed at helping 
governments exercise sovereignty responsibly by strengthening their 
capacities to protect populations from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity’ (the four mass atrocity crimes 
covered by Paragraph 138). 
                                                 
2  See Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2007), p. 117; Alex J Bellamy ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of 
military intervention’, International Affairs, 84 (4), 2008, p. 623. 
3  See G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty 
Under Law: US National Security in the 21st Century: Final Report of the 
Princeton Project on National Security (Princeton: Princeton Project for National 
Security, 2006), pp. 7-8; Susan E. Rice and Andrew J. Loomis, ‘The Evolution 
of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’, in Ivo H. 
Daalder (ed.), Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007), pp. 59-95. 
4  I am grateful to Alex Bellamy for suggesting these categories. I have also bene-
fited from the conceptual framework developed in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom 
Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996). 
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Consent freely given 
In terms of the question of the legal/legitimate basis for authorisation 
of armed intervention, the least problematic cases arise in situations 
where the host state and/or armed factions within the state welcome 
outside support and assistance (including armed intervention) to help 
them protect endangered civilians. Ideally this will take the form of 
early preventive action, but cases have arisen, and can be expected to 
arise again, where prevention fails and decisive action is required to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities.  
 
A text-book case of this kind was the UK’s intervention in Sierra 
Leone in May 2000. The context for this military action was the col-
lapse of the 1999 Lomé Accord. This agreement had initially ended 
the conflict between the Government of President Kabbah and the for-
ces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The latter refused to 
disarm as had been agreed and showed their contempt of the UN by 
seizing 500 of its peacekeepers (UNAMSIL) as hostages and by mar-
ching on the capital. Once again UN peacekeepers found themselves 
drifting into that most dangerous of situations where there was insuf-
ficient consent for peacekeeping but not enough combat capability for 
peace enforcement. The Blair Government decided to intervene to sta-
bilise the situation but not as part of UNAMSIL. The British mission 
prevented the fall of the capital to the RUF and rescued the peace pro-
cess. What is significant about this case is that the British Government 
deployed forces with the consent of the host government, though not 
with the consent of the RUF. This case is an important one because it 
shows that where the political will exists, foreign governments can 
respond in a timely and decisive manner to assist a state which is 
‘failing’ to provide protection to its citizens. 
 
This type of intervention raises the question of what happens if the 
consent is subsequently withdrawn. An example of this is the imple-
mentation of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement which established the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The 
mission was at the time ‘the largest and most expensive peacekeeping 
operation of its kind – the most expensive at US$2.8 billion; the larg-
est at 22,000 strong.’5 The intervention was plagued by questions of 
consent, originally provided and subsequently withdrawn by the two 
main protagonists. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), form-
erly the Khmer Rouge, was suspicious and resistant to the agreement 
from the outset. The Hun Sen Government was a little more welcome-
ing of the intervention, but it too threatened to retract its consent. 
Whilst the PDK saw the UN troops as supporting the Hun Sen Gov-
                                                 
5  David Roberts, 'More honoured in the breech: Consent and impartiality in the 
Cambodian peacekeeping operation', International Peacekeeping, 4(1), 1997, 
p.3. 
Nicholas J. Wheeler 12 
ernment, Hun Sen considered that the UN would oppose his 
government staying in power because it was supported by Communist 
Vietnam. Ultimately, this withdrawal of consent undermined the abil-
ity of the UN forces to implement the Paris Agreement.6 In this case 
and future situations of its kind, the question facing the UN is whether 
to enforce peace agreements on parties that backslide on their commit-
ments. 
Coerced and induced consent   
If the target state is opposed to military intervention on its soil, then 
the necessary consent for such deployments to prevent or end mass 
atrocities might be secured through positive inducements. But if this 
fails to secure the consent for an intervention to protect endangered 
populations, consideration might be given to what I have elsewhere 
called ‘coerced consent.’7 The latter arises in cases where military for-
ces are inserted into a situation requiring protection with the consent 
of the target state and/or armed factions inside the country, but this 
consent has only been secured through the threat or use of coercive 
(though non-forcible) measures. 
 
A good example of the direct application of coercive measures to 
secure consent is Indonesia’s reluctant decision on 12 September 1999 
to permit an Australian-led international force to enter the territory of 
East Timor which Indonesia claimed sovereignty over. The context for 
this was the violence that had immediately erupted on the island fol-
lowing the result of the referendum in which 75% of the 98.6% of 
registered voters had chosen independence. The Habibie Government 
had stubbornly refused to consent to an international force to restore 
security despite the fact that a 1,000 people had been killed and up to 
a quarter of the population had been driven from their homes by pro-
Indonesian militias who were opposed to independence. 
 
The coercive pressure to make Indonesia comply took the form of 
withdrawing IMF and World Bank loans and ending military assist-
ance, and the role of the United States was decisive here.8 In a speech 
on 9 September, President Clinton raised the spectre of the US acting 
to prevent Indonesia obtaining much needed IMF and World Bank 
                                                 
6  Raoul M. Jennar, 'UNTAC: "International Triumph" in Cambodia?', Security 
Dialogue, 25 (2), 1994, pp. 145-56. 
7  Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'East-Timor and the New Humanitarian 
Interventionism’, International Affairs, 77 (4), 2001, pp. 805-29. 
8  See Statement by the President on East Timor, 9 September 1999, 3, 
www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/timor, visited on 6 July 2001; Mark Suzman 
and Sander Thoenes, ‘US halts military links in move on E. Timor violence’, The 
Financial Times, 10 September 1999.  
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loans. He stated that his ‘own willingness to support future assistance 
will depend very strongly on the way Indonesia handles this situation.’ 
The President wanted to send a clear signal to political and military 
leaders in Indonesia that if the violence continued, ‘there will be over-
whelming public sentiment to stop the international economic 
cooperation…nobody is going to want to continue to invest there if 
they are allowing this sort of travesty to go on.’9  
 
The economic threat posed to Indonesia’s recovery after the Asian 
financial crisis by the loss of IMF and World Bank finance was com-
pounded by the fact that this would send a clear signal to investors 
that Indonesia was a bad risk, leading to greater pressure on the stabil-
ity of the currency and the economy in general. In addition to these 
economic considerations, the growing realisation that the crisis in East 
Timor was worsening was a key factor in Habibie’s decision on 12 
September to agree to the deployment of a multinational force.10  
 
The pressure applied against Jakarta was not just economic. It was 
also diplomatic, and this took three forms. First, it was highly fortuity-
ous that the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was 
meeting at heads of government level in Auckland at the same time as 
the crisis in East Timor was taking place. President Clinton and other 
world leaders were able to use the summit to pressurise Indonesian 
leaders into agreeing to the deployment of an international force to the 
island. The second factor was the mission sent by the Security Council 
to East Timor. The importance of this was that it demonstrated the 
strength of feeling in the Council on the question of Indonesia’s 
responsibility for the violence in East Timor to the Indonesian leader-
ship. The third factor in the shaming of Indonesia was the strong con-
sensus at the UN, best reflected in the open Security Council debate 
on 11 September, where the vast majority of the fifty or so govern-
ments present agreed that if Indonesia was unable or unwilling to re-
store security in East Timor then it should accept the offer of an inter-
national peacekeeping force.11 
  
The case of East Timor predates the development and adoption of 
R2P. However, it is an important case of how R2P might be operation-
                                                 
 9  Statement by the President on East Timor, 9 September 1999, 3, 7. 
10  According to Stephen Fidler and Gwen Robinson, this pressure ‘was instrumen-
tal in persuading Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force’ (‘IMF 
and World Bank played role in climbdown: East Timor lobbying effort exposes 
divisions over wisdom of sanctions’, The Financial Times, 13 September 1999). 
11  For a full transcript of the speeches, see 4043rd meeting of the Security Council 
held on Saturday 11 September, S/PV.4043, www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs, vis-
ited on 7 July 2001. 
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alised in future situations of this kind. Had R2P existed in 1999, it is 
evident that the killings and ethnic cleansing that were committed in 
the aftermath of the referendum would have led to R2P being invoked, 
and a consensus quickly established that Indonesia was failing to live 
up to its responsibilities under paragraph 138 of the Outcome Docu-
ment. East Timor is a good precedent because the Security Council 
was united that Indonesia was in breach of its legal and moral oblige-
tions to provide security for the East Timorese, and equally united in 
the pressures that were being applied to Jakarta. At the same time, 
there was no appetite in the Council for any armed intervention that 
lacked Indonesia’s consent, and Australia was emphatic that it would 
only intervene with a Chapter VII mandate which Canberra knew 
would only be forthcoming if Indonesia gave its consent. It was accep-
ted as a given of the discourse that unilateral action on the model of 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was unacceptable. 
 
Can the lessons of the East Timor case be applied to contemporary 
cases where mass atrocities have been and are taking place such as 
Zimbabwe and the Sudan? Indonesia in 1999 was particularly vulner-
able to the financial pressures that were applied against it, coming as 
they did in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Is Harare or Khar-
toum vulnerable to such pressures? As the East Timor case shows, the 
role of the United States is likely to be essential to the success of any 
future strategy of coerced consent. In this context, it has been argued 
that Washington could have played a key role in coercing the Sudan-
ese Government to comply with UN resolutions over Darfur and to 
end its complicity in the violence there.  
 
Susan Rice (former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 
the Clinton Administration and President elect Obama’s nomineee for 
US Ambassador to the UN) called in a speech in February 2007 for 
stronger coercive pressures to be employed against Khartoum. Her 
focus was the latter’s refusal to allow into Darfur the UN peacekeep-
ing force that had been given a Chapter VII mandate of civilian pro-
tection in Security Council Resolution 1706. She argued that the Bush 
Administration should impose crippling financial sanctions (going 
well beyond the asset freeze agreed to by the Security Council in 
2005) against the Sudanese Government and that these should not be 
lifted until the peacekeeping force had fully deployed and Khartoum 
had permanently and verifiably stopped all air and ground attacks in 
Darfur.12 Gareth Evans in discussing Darfur has argued that it ‘re-
mains, on any view, an “R2P situation”’, and he agreed with Rice that 
tougher measures should have been employed against Khartoum. At 
the same time, Evans has not been persuaded that Darfur satisfies the 
                                                 
12  Susan E. Rice, "The Escalating Crisis in Darfur", Speech before the Spring 
Africa Speaker Series, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, February 21, 2007. 
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relevant precautionary criteria that should be applied when consider-
ing the use of force for protection purposes (crucially on the question 
of whether force would do more good than harm). Consequently, he 
has looked to the international community to adopt other measures to 
coerce Khartoum into meeting its responsibilities for protection. But it 
is here that he has been disappointed considering that the international 
community has failed to apply the ‘sustained diplomatic, economic, 
and legal pressure to change the cost-benefit balance of the regime’s 
calculations.’13 
  
A key factor that has militated against coercive non-forcible – as well 
as forcible – action in the case of Darfur has been the divisions in the 
Council over whether the Sudanese Government has abdicated its 
sovereign responsibilities for protection. Those states on the Security 
Council which opposed applying stronger coercive measures against 
Khartoum anticipated the language in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
Outcome Document by arguing in 2002 –2003 that the crisis in Darfur 
had not yet reached the point where it was reasonable to argue that 
Sudan was failing in its responsibilities.14 This raises the question of 
what should happen if the Security Council is divided on the question 
of whether a government – to use the language in paragraph 139 of the 
Outcome Document – is ‘manifestly failing to protect their populati-
ons from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’. It is to the role of the Security Council in authorising non-
consensual intervention that I now turn.  
UN and Non-UN Models of Forcible Non-Consensual 
Intervention  
The rest of this report focuses on situations where consent for military 
intervention has not been secured – willingly or unwillingly – from 
the target state. Starting with the least controversial model where the 
Security Council authorises Member States and/or regional organisa-
tions to use force for protection purposes under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the report goes on to identify four alternative models that 
have been proposed as a way of securing legitimacy for military inter-
vention in cases where the Security Council fails to act in a timely and 
decisive manner to prevent or end mass atrocities. 
                                                 
13  Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once 
and For All, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 61. 
14  This problem is explored in Alex Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and 
Darfur’, Ethics and International Affairs, 19 (2), 2006, pp. 31-54. 
Nicholas J. Wheeler 16 
Security Council Authorisation 
Governments and heads of state agreed in Paragraph 139 of the 2005 
Outcome Document that to protect populations from ‘genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ they were ‘pre-
pared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner’, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, includ-
ing Chapter VII’. Such an agreement was a momentous one when it is 
considered how resistant Member States were during the Cold War to 
exercising Chapter VII in this way. During this period, the Security 
Council interpreted what counted as a threat to ‘international peace 
and security’ very narrowly, restricting it to cross-border aggression. 
This interpretation was inimical to the protection of basic humani-
tarian values.15  
 
Today, it is becoming less and less conceivable that the Security 
Council would oppose a state or group of states seeking a mandate to 
end genocide, mass killing and large-scale ethnic cleansing on the 
grounds that this violated a state’s sovereign rights. It is this normative 
transformation that is registered in the 2005 agreement by govern-
ments and heads of state to paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document. 
Without underestimating the significance of the 2005 agreement, it is 
important to understand that this was a codification of the Security 
Council’s practice in the 1990s. What changed in the first decade after 
the end of the Cold War was the Security Council’s expansion of the 
boundaries of legitimate intervention by defining humanitarian emerg-
encies inside a state’s borders as a threat to ‘international peace and 
security’. The importance of this normative development was that it 
made possible UN enforcement action under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.16  
 
However, there are three caveats that have to be borne in mind when 
claiming, as Kofi Annan did when UN Secretary-General, that there is 
a ‘developing international norm’17 forcibly to protect endangered 
populations. The first is that governments remain extremely sensitive 
about trespassing on the sovereignty of other states. Member states are 
                                                 
15  Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in Inter-
national Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
16  It would be wrong to give the impression that this pushing out of the boundaries 
of legitimate intervention was uncontested. Rather, as the deliberations over 
intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and in Somalia in 1992 demonstrated, there 
was resistance from those states that worried about setting precedents that might 
erode the principle of non-intervention (see Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 139-
207). 
17  Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, Address to the 54th Session of 
the General Assembly, 20 September 1999, reprinted in Kofi A. Annan, The 
Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary General, New York: 
United Nations, 1999, p. 44. 
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cognizant that the United Nations was created to prevent wars, not to 
become an instrument for their propagation. Consequently, in the 
absence of target state consent, the Security Council is only going to 
authorize armed action to protect fellow humans in exceptional cir-
cumstances and where it is believed that the costs of military action 
are massively outweighed by the moral consequences of inaction. The 
bar, then, for UN-authorized humanitarian intervention is very high, 
and most states will support such action only in cases of genocide and 
mass killing and where it does not impinge upon important interests. 
 
Secondly, the much-vaunted claim that there is a ‘developing inter-
national norm’ to protect civilians appears very hollow when viewed 
from the perspective of the millions who have perished in the past ten 
years from genocide and war in Rwanda, Sudan, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the case of NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo, the major Western states were prepared to employ force for a 
complex mix of humanitarian and security reasons. But the emergent 
norm of civilian protection was insufficient to motivate these same 
governments to put their troops in harm’s way to save Rwandans from 
genocide in 1994. Though the norm enables new possibilities of inter-
vention, it does not ensure that such actions will take place when they 
are morally required. The moral limitations of the project of humani-
tarian intervention in the 1990s can be seen in the fact that in no case 
have states intervened when there were no vital interests at stake and/ 
or where there were perceived to be significant risks to the lives of the 
intervening forces. This produces a pattern of intervention that is 
highly selective, frequently driven by considerations of national self-
interest rather than humanitarian need.18 It also ensures that, when 
intervention does take place, it is widely viewed as morally hypocriti-
cal, a rhetorical instrument that rationalizes the projection of force by 
the powerful. The US-led war against Iraq in 2003 is only the latest 
intervention where this long-standing critique can be strongly heard. 
 
The third point to realize about the developing norm of UN authorised 
humanitarian intervention is that the consensus over armed interven-
tion does not extend to unilateral action (defined as an intervention not 
authorized by the Security Council). It is evident from the position 
taken by the vast majority of states in debates in the General Assemb-
                                                 
18  In some cases military intervention is rightly ruled out on the grounds that armed 
action would do more harm than good (Chechnya and Tibet are obvious ex-
amples here). As Michael Ignatieff notes, ‘perfect consistency is a test of legiti-
macy that political action can never meet, and hence the prerequisite of consist-
ency serves (even if it does not intend to do so) either as a justification for doing 
nothing or as a condemnation of any intervention actually undertaken’ (Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights, Power and the State’, in Simon Chesterman, Michael 
Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, (eds), Making States Work, Tokyo: United Nati-
ons University Press, 2005, p. 60). 
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ly that there is no support for a legal right of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. Many Southern states remain worried that such a right 
would become a weapon that the strong would use against the weak. 
This normative position is codified in the language in paragraph 139 
of the Outcome Document which explicitly states that any military 
action to protect endangered populations can only be taken through 
the existing collective security provisions in the UN Charter.  
 
However, not all governments have been or are prepared to accept 
such a restriction on the use of force. This raises the vexed question of 
how the international community should proceed if Security Council 
members – especially the permanent members – are divided over 
whether a particular case warrants armed intervention? If the Security 
Council is paralysed from acting because of the power of the veto, 
how should the international community judge a state or group of 
states that justify the use of force as preventing or ending mass atroci-
ties? This is the moral and legal conundrum that was posed by 
NATO’s action in Kosovo. 
The Security Council as a global jury 
It is clear from the Security Council’s response to NATO’s use of 
force against Yugoslavia that ringing statements of principle about the 
illegality of unilateral action are not necessarily a reliable guide to 
how states will react in specific cases where they have to balance con-
flicting legal and moral concerns. The 2001 report by the International 
Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) had sug-
gested that the prospect of future unilateral actions could be helpful in 
sending a clear message to the Security Council that it would under-
mine its authority if it failed to exercise what the ICISS viewed as ‘its 
responsibility to protect, in a conscience-shocking situation crying out 
for action.’19 If this was a veiled reference to Kosovo, then it over-
looked the fact that the Council was divided on what constituted the 
proper exercise of its ‘responsibility’ in this case. 
 
One key theme that underlies some of the statements in the Council 
during the Kosovo crisis was that Russia and China had behaved ire-
sponsibly by threatening to veto a draft resolution authorising 
NATO’s use of force.20 Such an interpretation of the case led the 
ICISS to recommend that ‘The Permanent Five members of the Secur-
ity Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters 
where their vital interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of 
resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection pur-
                                                 
19  The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, Canada, 2001, p. 55. 
20  S/PV.3988, 24 March, 1999, pp. 6-7. 
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poses for which there is otherwise majority support.’21 The problem 
with this proposal as a way of preventing a future Kosovo-type situ-
ation where one or more veto-bearing permanent members oppose the 
majority will of the Council is that it ignores how far Russia and 
China might have had genuine misgivings about whether the use of 
force was justified to end the humanitarian crisis, absent whatever 
instrumental reasons they may also have had to oppose NATO’s 
armed intervention. 
 
The conundrum that faced Security Council members over Kosovo 
was that whilst NATO’s intervention was a clear breach of specific 
provisions of the Charter, the illegality of its action had to be weighed 
against the moral imperative to rescue the Kosovars. The result was 
that the majority of non-Western states on the Council operated an 
international equivalent to mitigation in domestic law systems. The 
best evidence for this is the defeat by twelve votes to three (Russia, 
China and Namibia) of the Russian draft resolution demanding a halt 
to the bombing. Five states on the Council were members of NATO, 
but the other seven votes were cast by Slovenia (a friend of the West 
and strongly opposed to the Milošević regime), Argentina, Brazil, 
Bahrain, Malaysia, Gabon, and Gambia. These Council members re-
jected the Russian resolution because they accepted that NATO’s 
action was justifiable on humanitarian grounds. Having witnessed the 
horrific consequences of Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and fearful 
that this was about to be repeated in Kosovo, they were persuaded that 
such atrocities could not be tolerated again.  
 
Thomas Franck argued that ‘the essence of mitigation is that the law 
recognises the continuing force of the rule in general, while also 
accepting that in extraordinary circumstances, condoning a carefully 
calibrated and justifiable violation may do more to rescue the law’s 
legitimacy than would its rigorous implementation.’22 Supporting this 
legal interpretation of the case, NATO did not rely on an explicit legal 
rationale, and its claim to be acting to prevent a humanitarian emerg-
ency could be interpreted as a plea in mitigation. Franck argued that 
when faced with such pleas, the role of the UN’s political organs – 
crucially the Council – is to act as ‘a global jury’23 in which the text of 
the Charter is balanced against the moral necessities of the case.  
 
The moral and legal responsibility that falls on those who intervene 
without Council authority is to persuade the Council – and wider glo-
                                                 
 
21  The Responsibility to Protect, xiii. 
22 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed 
Attacks, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 185. 
23   Franck, Recourse to Force, p. 186. 
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bal opinion – that its action should be excused or tolerated on humani-
tarian grounds. And if states are not condemned by the Security Coun-
cil for breaking the law in such cases, or only pay a minor penalty for 
such infractions, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Security 
Council would be operating a principle of mitigation as it did over 
Kosovo.  
General Assembly Authorisation 
According to paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document, collective 
action in support of R2P must be ‘in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII.’ If the Security Council fails to take action to 
prevent or end mass atrocities because of the threat or use of the veto, 
then there is the alternative of seeking General Assembly approval for 
military intervention. The General Assembly has competence under 
the Charter to recommend (but not authorise) military measures when 
the Security Council is unable to exercise its ‘primary responsibility 
for maintaining international peace and security’. Although the ICISS 
report argued that the task was to make the Security Council work 
better, it did recommend that recourse might be made to the General 
Assembly if the threat or use of the veto was blocking an intervention 
for protection purposes that had majority support. The Commission 
argued that states should always request Council authorisation before 
having recourse to this alternative UN route (NATO failed this test 
over Kosovo), and that if the veto was exercised in such circum-
stances, consideration should be given to convening a special session 
of the General Assembly under the 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolu-
tion.24 Adopted at the height of the Cold War, this Resolution was a 
way of bypassing the Soviet veto in the Security Council. However, it 
is important to realise that there is no constitutional basis in the UN 
Charter for the General Assembly to override the right of veto granted 
to permanent members of the Security Council in Article 27 (3). 
 
The advantages of using the General Assembly to legitimise (but not 
legalise) military intervention for protection purposes are two-fold: 
first, in negating the veto power of the P5 in circumstances where they 
are unwilling to act in the face of the most severe humanitarian crises, 
it nevertheless keeps collective action within the bounds of the UN 
system (as required by paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document). 
Second, if a two-thirds majority for military action could be secured in 
the General Assembly, then this would give a significant measure of 
international legitimacy to an intervention. As Evans wrote, ‘if a 
decision were supported by an overwhelming majority of member 
states, it would provide a high degree of legitimacy for a military 
intervention (and had the procedure been tested in the cases of 
                                                 
24  The Responsibility to Protect, p. 53. 
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Rwanda and Kosovo, it is conceivable that there would have been 
such support).’25  
 
It is a fascinating counterfactual as to whether NATO would have se-
cured majority support in the Council had it followed these procedures 
over Kosovo, and whether in the event of a Russian or Chinese veto, a 
resolution supporting military action prior to the commencement of 
hostilities would have elicited the necessary two-thirds majority in the 
General Assembly. Some NATO governments (notably Canada)26 
suggested this course of action over Kosovo, but it was the negative 
consideration of pursuing this option that weighed heavier with 
NATO member-states, especially the United Kingdom and the United 
States. London publicly claimed that it did not go down the ‘Uniting 
for Peace’ road over Kosovo because the General Assembly lacked 
the legal competence to determine enforcement action of this kind.27 
However, this legal argument belied the fact that the United Kingdom 
was nervous that the Alliance would secure a two thirds majority in 
the Assembly recommending military action. There were two further 
political factors that militated against using the Assembly at the time 
and which remain pertinent today.  
 
The first was that had the vote been close, or even lost, then this 
would have damaged NATO’s claims to be acting on behalf of the 
moral purposes of wider international society as embodied in the three 
Chapter VII resolutions demanding that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia end its large-scale ethnic cleansing. Second, some NATO 
governments were very conscious that giving the Assembly this 
degree of legitimacy would erode the power of the veto in the 
Council. The United Kingdom and the United States felt it was neces-
sary to bypass the veto in this particular case, but they did not want to 
issue a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the veto. One of the con-
cerns here was that such a precedent might embolden the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) to use the Assembly to adopt a resolution recom-
mending military action against Israel.  
 
Given these political considerations, the three Western permanent 
members of the Council firmly opposed proposals that would have 
enhanced the role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Council. 
Moreover, this position was supported by Russia and China who were 
determined to maintain the primacy of the Council since it is the one 
body where they continue to have major influence in the global arena.  
                                                 
25  Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 136. 
26  Author’s interviews with Canadian officials in 2001-2002. 
27  See the testimony of Mr Emyr Jones Parry, Political Director of the Foreign 
Office, to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, 
‘Kosovo’, 18 November, 2000, p. 67. 
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Regional Arrangements 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognises an explicit role for regional 
organisations in the promotion of international peace and security. 
However, Chapter VIII also states that ‘no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorization of the Security Council.’ Consequently, it is important to 
distinguish between regional organisations that act as sub-contractors 
of the UN as against regional actors that act independently without 
prior UN authorisation.28 
 
There have been cases of military intervention by regional bodies that 
have not had prior UN authorisation. For example, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) monitoring group’s 
(ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia in 1992 and Sierra Leone in 
1997.29 However, in both these cases, the Security Council provided 
an important measure of what the ICISS called ‘ex post facto authori-
zation’ in resolutions adopted after the interventions had taken 
place.30 These precedents led the ICISS to propose that where the 
Security Council was unable or unwilling to act, recourse might be 
made to regional arrangements and organisations. This position finds 
support in Susan Rice and Andrew Loomis’s 2007 recommendation 
that ‘Decisions to support intervention by relevant or concerned 
regional bodies should be deemed sufficient to legitimize action by 
their members when Security Council authorisation is sought but not 
forthcoming’.31 NATO’s unilateral (defined as non-Security Council 
authorised) intervention in Kosovo is the most dramatic example of 
regional action of this kind, though it would fail Rice and Loomis’s 
test because NATO did not formally table a resolution seeking 
Security Council authorisation.  
                                                
 
Building on the precedents of Liberia and Sierra Leone, African states, 
have shown an increasing willingness to develop both the capacity and 
legal framework to conduct armed interventions for protection pur-
poses. Within a short period after the ICISS published its report, the 
 
28  I am grateful to Kristin Marie Haugevik for this distinction. See her report 
‘Regionalizing the Responsibility to Protect: Possibilities, Capabilities and 
Actualities’, NUPI Report Responsibility to Protect, No. 2, 2008. for a fuller 
discussion of the role of regional organisations in operationalising R2P. 
29  Jeremy Levitt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Con-
flicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone’, Temple Inter-
national and Comparative Law Journal, 12 (2) 1998, pp. 333-75. 
30  The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, Canada, 2001, p. 54. See also Donald 
Sylvan, International Intervention: Sovereignty versus Responsibility (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 107. 
31  Rice and Loomis, ‘The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention and the Respons-
ibility to Protect’, p. 91. 
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African Union (AU) which was the successor to the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) produced a new charter that mandated interven-
tion in certain circumstances, even without Security Council authori-
sation. Article 4(h) of The Constitutive Act of the AU establishes ‘the 
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a deci-
sion of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.  
  
However, translating the AU’s humanitarian commitments into effect-
ive civilian protection remains a daunting task as its role in Darfur has 
shown. Despite Article 4(h), the AU has been reluctant to act without 
Khartoum’s consent which has claimed that it is capable of protecting 
its own citizens. Nevertheless, as Rice and Loomis have argued, the 
AU was ‘the only international actor willing to face bullets to save 
civilians in Darfur.’32 It deployed a 7,000 strong force with a mandate 
of humanitarian protection and assisting in the process of confidence-
building between the warring parties. But it has been severely hamp-
ered in these efforts by inadequate resources and logistic support, 
despite contributions from Western governments. Nick Grono has 
argued that in practice the AU force ‘is largely an observer mission. It 
does not have a mandate to go out and proactively protect civilians. In 
fact, it can only protect civilians when they are being attacked in its 
presence, and only then if it feels it has enough troops to intervene — 
and too often it does not.’33 In 2006 the AU recognised the limitations 
of its efforts at civilian protection and called for a larger UN force to 
replace it. In response the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII 
Resolution 1706 which called for a force of 22,000 to provide protec-
tion of civilians in Darfur.  
 
There have been some discussions as to whether the AU could inter-
vene to end the human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Prime Minister 
Raila Odinga of Kenya called in December 2008 for the African 
Union to oust Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. However, his 
plea has fallen on deaf ears and it is highly unlikely that the AU will 
forcibly intervene in Zimbabwe unless the oppression and killings 
reach genocidal levels. Even then, there are severe limits on the politi-
cal, financial, and military capacities of the AU as an intervention 
force. As Wafula Okumu has pointed out, ‘In view of the stark reali-
ties facing the AU – particularly its convoluted decision-making pro-
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33  Nick Grono, ‘Briefing-Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Pro-
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cess, lack of resources, and lack of political will – it is not likely that it 
will intervene to protect the livelihoods of Zimbabweans.’34 
Capacity building is clearly a key challenge facing the AU and this 
underlines the urgency of realising the G-8 commitment to train and 
equip five inter-operable brigades in Africa. However, even if the AU 
develops the capacity to act in a timely and decisive manner in the 
face of mass atrocities, there will remain the question as to whether 
African governments have sufficient solidarity and interests with their 
neighbours to place their forces in harm’s way to save African civili-
ans. In addition, there is the question as to whether future interventi-
ons aimed at protecting civilians that lack the consent of the target 
states should be expressly authorised by the Security Council, given 
the language in Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit. 
Coalitions of the Willing 
As I noted earlier, the ICISS report had suggested that the prospect of 
unilateral action could be helpful in sending a clear message to the 
Security Council that it would undermine its authority if it failed to 
effectively respond to conscience-shocking atrocities. There is no case 
where a coalition of states have formally requested Council authorisa-
tion for an intervention to prevent or end mass atrocities and this has 
been rejected on grounds that such an action would breach a state’s 
sovereignty. As we have seen, the ICISS report opened the door to the 
possibility in such cases of states circumventing Council authority by 
having recourse to the General Assembly and/or regional organisa-
tions. However, what is often overlooked is that the ICISS report was 
emphatic that recourse to these bodies would only become possible if 
a majority of council members supported an armed intervention and 
this majority will was then frustrated by the exercise of the veto. It fol-
lowed that if majority support was lacking in the Council, then this 
effectively closed the door on states utilising these other alternatives 
to the Council. The careful wording in the report reflected the need to 
balance the different views within the Commission as to how far 
ICISS should advocate bypassing the strict procedural rules of the UN 
Charter. 
 
The attempt by ICISS to legitimate an exit from the strict Charter 
framework has been rejected by those who see it as too permissive in 
permitting non-UN authorised intervention as well as by those who 
see it as too constraining of such interventions. With regard to the for-
mer, the agreement in paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document that 
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any action to protect populations must be taken through the existing 
collective security machinery of the Charter can be seen as an attempt 
to firmly bolt the door that ICISS had tried to push open a little. For 
those who viewed the ICISS recommendation as too constraining in 
requiring states to table a resolution seeking approval for military 
action that secures at least nine votes, paragraph 139 cannot be the last 
word on the legitimacy of intervention.  
 
Supporters of this view recognise that governments which act without 
Council authorisation take on in former US legal advisor Abraham 
Sofaer’s words ‘the burden of persuading governments, courts, and 
the public of the propriety of [their] actions.’35 Rice and Loomis, for 
example, argued that in seeking post-hoc legitimation for their actions, 
a ‘coalition of the compassionate’ should be ready to defend their 
actions in the following terms: 
 
When all else fails, a member state or coalition of members may 
intervene to save lives at their own risk and expense and seek 
retroactive UN or regional support. In this instance the gravity 
of the humanitarian crisis, the purity of humanitarian motives, 
and the efficacy and proportionality of the military action should 
be critical considerations in the achievement of ex post facto 
legitimization. Member states that take such action should be 
prepared to have their intervention formally condemned and 
penalties assessed if it fails to meet the above criteria.36  
 
Rice and Loomis were making a number of assumptions here that 
should be questioned. First, there is no agreement on the criteria that 
should be employed to judge the legitimacy of an intervention of this 
kind, and little or no likelihood of any such consensus being reached 
at the UN in the near to medium term. Second, even if it is possible in 
the future to reach an agreement on criteria, it is mistaken to think that 
this will resolve the disagreements that have paralysed Security Coun-
cil action in cases like Kosovo and Darfur. The problem is that gov-
ernments might agree on the relevant criteria to be applied, but 
disagree over their application in specific cases. This difficulty can be 
seen in the debate over whether force should have been used to end 
the human suffering in Darfur. Rice, Loomis, and Evans all agree that 
Darfur is a case where R2P should be applied, but the latter disagrees 
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with Rice and Loomis on the question as to whether the use of violent 
means can promote humanitarian ends in this case.37  
 
Resolving substantive disagreements over the efficacy of military 
action to end mass atrocities requires an agreed procedural mechanism 
that everyone accepts as authoritative. But as this report has shown, 
there is no consensus on where ultimate authority should be located 
for the use of force in contemporary international society. 
Conclusion 
The 2005 Outcome Document omitted any discussion of the limited 
alternatives to Security Council authorisation that had been proposed 
in the ICISS report, and had such issues been seriously pressed, they 
would have derailed any agreement on R2P. In seeking to bolt the 
door firmly against interventions that lacked express Security Council 
authorisation, the Outcome Document retreated from the important 
attempt in the ICISS report to provide a humanitarian emergency exit 
from the strict procedural rules of the UN Charter. The result is that it 
is not evident that the UN is any better placed today to cope with a 
future Kosovo than it was in 1999 when the Security Council was 
divided over the merits of preventive armed intervention. 
 
Such a situation could have arisen in the case of Darfur had the United 
States, United Kingdom, and other Western states, perhaps with the 
support of some African governments, sought a mandate from the 
Security Council for a non-consensual armed intervention in Darfur. 
Perhaps in such a situation, members of the Security Council, include-
ing crucially Russia and China, would have felt compelled to grant a 
UN mandate in the face of claims that such an action was the only 
means to end the humanitarian catastrophe. But if these members of 
the P5 had continued to oppose the use of force, would those Western 
states that felt morally compelled to act once again have broken with 
the principle of UN authority? 
 
NATO’s unilateralism over Kosovo demonstrates that Western gov-
ernments are not always prepared to wait for Council authorization 
when they believe that the preventive use of force is necessary to pro-
tect endangered peoples. In such situations, the real question is: who is 
acting irresponsibly, those who seek to end the killings in the absence 
of a clear UN mandate or those who argue that such actions break 
international law and hence undermine the rules restricting the use of 
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force? How the moral imperative to save endangered peoples can be 
satisfied in cases where the Security Council is unwilling or unable to 
act without this generating the negative political repercussions that 
inevitably accompany unilateral action remains a challenge that advo-
cates of R2P continue to wrestle with. 
 
The best defence of NATO’s action in Kosovo is that it was an antici-
patory intervention aimed at preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. 
But interventions of this kind are always going to be the most difficult 
to legitimate, especially to governments that are nervous about any 
erosion of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. It 
becomes much easier to justify using violent means when the target 
state has committed mass atrocities that have been widely reported in 
the media. However, any armed rescue that then takes place will come 
too late for many. This assessment also applies to the mobilisation of 
non-forcible coercive pressures as in the case of East-Timor. It would 
not have been possible to mobilise the economic and political pres-
sures on Jakarta to secure its consent to an international force in the 
absence of the rising levels of violence in East Timor. 
 
The case of Rwanda offers a further illustration of how outside inter-
vention only becomes possible once the killings and violence have 
been reported. It is the case that the barrier to intervention, once the 
genocide had started in 1994, was not the lack of UN authority but the 
absence of political will. It is inconceivable that the Security Council 
would have blocked a non-consensual forcible intervention on the 
grounds that this violated Rwanda’s sovereignty. However, if the 
clock is turned back to January 1994 when the UN force commander 
was seeking a change of mandate to permit peace enforcement opera-
tions against the government-sponsored Hutu militias who would 
spearhead the genocide, it is by no means evident that the Security 
Council would have authorised an armed intervention. Yet we now 
know that such action was desperately needed and might have pre-
vented the subsequent genocide. Without the benefit of hindsight, 
Council members – perhaps a majority – would have worried in the 
months preceding the genocide that a non-consensual intervention of 
this kind posed too great a challenge to the principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention upon which interstate order is founded. Preven-
tion might be the most important dimension of operationalising R2P, 
but more consideration needs to be given to how far prevention 
requires a coercive military element (as in Rwanda and East Timor), 
and how anticipatory actions of this kind can be legitimated to wider 
international and domestic publics. 
